

Retired Soldiers and the Support Conflict of the 2014 Presidential Election

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ABSTRACT

The involvement of the purnawirawan TNI (Indonesian retired soldiers) in politics does not always fully facilitate civil and military relation in Indonesia. The findings of this study suggest that the participation of retired soldiers in Indonesian politics has led to conflicts of interest among themselves and established a strong relation between them and the civilian government. The retired soldiers hold strategic governmental positions such as the Minister, Chief of Presidential Staff, Board of State-Owned Enterprise Directors. Such relation is formed as a part of the political negotiation by the retired soldiers and the civilian government within the Indonesian political dynamics, especially at the 2014 presidential election.

Keywords: retired soldiers, conflicts of interest, Election, Presidential

A. Introduction

Retired soldiers as a member of civil society essentially has a voting right and can be involved in a practical politics. However, the similar condition is not applicable to active military personnel whose political rights are restricted by the State in Law No. 34 of 2004. The law explicitly states that military personnel in service are not allowed

to involve themselves in the practical politics; whether to vote or to be voted.

The involvement of retired military personnel in politics also becomes the evidence in several countries, such as Nigeria (Adejumobi, 1999). The purpose of their inclusion is to influence government policy. The presence of these personnel in politics is identified by the remilitarization of the state and the weakening of civilian politics allowing the retired military personnel to involve themselves in politics easily.

Meanwhile, Alfian (2015) mentions that the military in Turkey is positioned as the forefront of the revolution whose right to intervene politics if the state stability is in jeopardy. In this context, military is positioned as both national guard and supervisory commission and become the institution with the rights to interpret Kemalis. Similar to Indonesia, many Turkish retired military personnel who are involved in political parties influence the policies of the country.

In Indonesian political context, the retired soldiers are considered one of the dominant political forces. During the New Order (*Orde Baru*) regime, they who were enlisted in the Association of ABRI retired soldiers (*Persatuan Purnawiran TNI ABRI* or PEPABRI) showed their support to Golkar party in the elections. In the 2007 General Assembly XIII in Jakarta, PEPABRI declared its independence and became a non-partisan organization with patriotic character.

Furthermore, in the Reformation Era, there were at least five political parties established by the retired soldiers such as; 1) *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* (PKPI) with General Edi Sudrajat (Ret.) as its leader, 2) *Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa* (PKPB) led by General Raden Haro (Ret.); 3) *Partai Demokrat* with General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Ret.) as its leader. 4) *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya* or Gerindra with Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto (Ret.) as its leader; and 5) *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat* or Hanura with General Wiranto (Ret.) as its leader.

Some of the post New Order retired soldiers obtained strategic positions in the cabinet. For example, during the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid, there were at least four (4) retired soldiers appointed as ministers. In Megawati Soekarno Puteri regime, 4 (four) retired soldiers were also appointed as ministers. Meanwhile, during the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Period, there were also 5 (five) retired soldiers appointed as ministers. Finally, in the current polity, Joko Widodo has selected 9 (nine) retired soldiers to sit in the ministerial positions.

Salim Said (personal interview, October 10, 2018) pointed out that the retired soldiers who had retired from the Army were considered civilians. However, some misunderstand that these retired

military personnel still have similar political rights and status like those active military personnel. After they are retired from the Army, the retired soldiers are on their own with no military assignments given to them since they are no longer connected to the military service and works. Nevertheless, it does not rule out the possibility of these retired military personnel forming relation with political figures or the government.

The inclusion of the retired soldiers in the Indonesian political dynamics indicates their high political aspirations to gain positions within the government both in executive and legislative. The political role of the retired soldiers can go head-to-head with other candidates, and they play behind the scenes to enable the competing candidates to win the election. The participation of the retired soldiers in political activities will certainly be a question as what their motivation to involve in politics is, whether their political involvement will cause conflicts of interest among the retired soldiers and what benefits they got from supporting the presidential candidates at the 2014 election.

The purpose of this study is to elaborate: First, the motivation of the retired soldiers' involvement in politics; Second, the conflict of among the retired soldiers regarding their support to the 2014 Presidential Election; Third, the relation of the retired soldiers and the administration of Joko Widodo.

B. Discussion

The Retired soldiers and Political Motive

The political role of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) has been abolished by withdrawing the Military/Police factions from parliament at the Annual Session of MPR (The People' Consultative Assembly of the Republic Indonesia). On September 25, 2004, the Military/Police faction and the Group Representative Faction were no longer in parliament. Politically, the ending of this faction in parliament was also the epilogue of the military *dwifungsi* (dual function) in Indonesia. The reformation within the Indonesian National Armed Forces indicates that the Indonesian military has moved towards professionalism. This professionalism is really needed to protect the identity of the Indonesian National Armed Forces i.e. the *Sapta Marga* (Armed Force Pledge) and the *Sumpah Prajurit* (Soldier Oath). The professionalism should also be supported by the sufficient budgeting, the military personnel's ability in doctrine, education and use of modern weaponry.

After officially withdrawing itself from the parliament, the Indonesian National Armed Forces is also prohibited from engaging in political activities as defined in the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law No. 34/2004. In Article 39 Section 2 states that "the military personnel are not allowed to engage in practical political

activities". Article 47 Section 1 states that "The military personnel can only occupy civilian positions upon resignation or retirement from active military service." If the active military members are involved in politics, they must resign from the military in accordance with the mandatory Law.

The prohibition to involve in politics has led some retired soldiers to form the political parties as they are means to engage in politics and other state affairs. The purpose of these political parties is to gain constitutional position and power. Many political parties emerged after the collapse of the New Order including; 1) *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* or PKPI with General Edi Sudrajat (Ret.) as its leader; 2) *Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa* or PKPB led by General Raden Hartono (Ret.); 3) *Partai Demokrat* with General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Ret.) as its leader. 4) *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya* or Gerindra with Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto (Ret.) as its leader; and 5) *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat* or Hanura with General Wiranto (Ret.) as its leader.

The retired soldiers' participation in politics, according to Sosilo (2012) is influenced by several factors such as: the political parties and political conditions in general, the characterization of the military personnel, their status as a civilian, the age of retirement; the power orientation and post-retirement activities, the experience of military dual function, and the organization of the Retired soldiers Association. Some of these factors were also found in this study. Furthermore, one of the most influential factors is that the presidential figure is from the retired soldiers.

Salim Said explained that institutionally the Indonesian National Armed Forces no longer played a political role but those involved in politics were the retired military personnel or also known as the retired soldiers. The political position of the retired soldiers is the same as that of the civilian with the right to engage in politics; to vote, and to be voted. As stated by Salim Said:

"... They are the important figures of the Indonesian military reformation. They have left the military dual function meaning that they as military personnel no longer play an active political role. Those involved in active politics are the retired soldiers and that is normal. The retired soldiers is a citizen who has the right to involve in politics..." (personal interview, August 7, 2019)

The retired soldiers have right to make political choices, to establish a political party, to join as a member of a political party, to be a local government candidate such as mayor, regent, and governor, and to become presidential campaign volunteer. The researcher will elaborate this political motive later elaborates.

The retired soldiers' political participation significantly increased in 2004 with the election of Yudhoyono as the 5th President of the Republic of Indonesia. Yudhoyono became a magnet for other retired soldiers to join politics. There were at least 4 (four) retired soldiers serving as ministers during the two-period reign of Yudhoyono as the President of the Indonesia. They were Admiral Widodo AS (Ret.), Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto (Ret.), Lieutenant General Sudi Silalahi (Ret.), Lieutenant General EE Manggindaan (Ret.).

According to Aminuddin (2018), there are at least two factors that increase Yudhoyono's popularity in the election; The first factor is the public longing for military figures and the presence of "strong men" as the head of the nation unlike the previous "weak" civilian national leadership seen in the previous administration of Habibie, Wahid and Megawati. The second is the conflict between Yudhoyono and Megawati causing his dismissal from the cabinet and leading him to gain sympathy from the public. In both cases, Yudhoyono later became a democratic military figure, which managed to raise his popularity.

The same thing happened at the 2014 Presidential Election. Prabowo, a former military, became a unique catalyst for the retired soldiers to join politics and became his campaign volunteer. There were at least 15 volunteers from the retired soldiers involved in Prabowo's winning team on the Advisory and the Executive Board (Detik, May 28, 2014). Moreover, there were four declarations made by the retired soldiers to support Prabowo such as Pancoran Declaration, Jagorawi Declaration, Gorontalo Declaration, and Tangerang Declaration. These declarations were a form of support given by the retired soldiers to the former military personnel who participated in the presidential election. These four declarations will be explained in the next section of this article.

Prabowo's character as a responsible soldier with high solidarity is one of the factors that attract the retired soldiers' interest to join politics. One of these retired soldiers is AT (personal interview, January 23, 2018) who joined a political party because of his close relationship with Prabowo. Prabowo is considered accountable, discipline, and assertive. SP also revealed that Prabowo is a responsible man and the victim of the conspiracy carried out by BJ Habibie and Wiranto. Prabowo is considered responsible for Tri Sakti incidence and the disappearance of several student activists during the New Order regime. (Tempo, May, 13, 2014).

Meanwhile, CS gave his support to Prabowo to build solidarity among former military personnel. Prabowo's participation as Indonesian presidential candidate was a bold move by one of the former military personnel. Thus, it needed the full support from the retired soldiers to make him elected as the next president:

"... I'm sure we all have the spirit of togetherness, we are proud to have one of our retired soldiers (Prabowo) as a presidential candidate, and as a retired soldier who keeps his oath to serve and love Indonesia always... An oath cannot be revoked, and it is held (in the soldier's mind). Therefore, it is possible to establish unity among us that we must keep..." (Merdeka, May 21, 2014)

Meanwhile, KZ (personal interview, January 23, 2019) mentioned that his involvement in the political world is a form of participation from the retired soldiers who have become a member of civil society. When it came to the 2014 presidential election, as a former soldier, Prabowo obviously had a choice. Several of their views of electing Prabowo include: First, the military personnel strongly adhere to *Sapta Marga* (Armed Force Pledge) and the *Sumpah Prajurit* (Soldier Oath), defends the interests and sovereignty of the nation as well as fight against communism. Second, with his election as a president, Prabowo will automatically improve the well-being of the military personnel and the retired soldiers.

From the above condition, some military figures considered to be reformist, discipline, accountable and capable of providing security to their subordinates. Such characteristics are one of the factors that bring the retired soldiers to political world. Yudhoyono is regarded as a charismatic, calm, and authoritative figure while Prabowo is considered a discipline and responsible figure.

On the other hand, the participation of the retired soldiers in politics is often motivated by pragmatic factors including financial needs. It was told by KS that one of the reasons why the retired soldiers were getting involved in politics was the small amount of pension they receive. Financially, the retired soldiers realized that they only receive a small amount of pension, so they need extra income, either from business activities or political parties as well as gaining position as a Member of Parliament, Governor, Mayor, or Regent.

Therefore, the researcher concludes that the motivation for the retired soldiers to involve politics is the influence of good military figures. These figures are represented by Yudhoyono and Prabowo. They are regarded as central figures who receive the support and sympathy from the public. The difference is that Yudhoyono was elected as Indonesian President for two periods while Prabowo lost twice in the presidential election in 2014 and 2019.

There are still some potential rising stars among such as Nurmatyo and Andika Perkasa in the coming election. These two figures will at least motivate the retired soldiers to join politics. If these two retired soldiers involve themselves in politics, they have

two options: either joining an already existing political party or establishing their own political party. The two figures have a good track record in public view.

The Support Conflict of the Retired Soldiers

The 2014 Presidential Election created fraction among the retired soldiers, those supporting Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa and those supporting Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. Both groups of the retired soldiers made the declaration in favor of a potential candidate. The declaration made in an attempt to win their chosen candidate and many retired soldiers were involved in the declaration.

The support provided by the retired soldiers to the presidential candidates has led to a conflict among the retired soldiers. The term conflict in political science is often defines as violence, such as riot, terrorism, and revolution. Meanwhile, according to Ramlan Surbakti (1992), conflict means of clashes such as differences of opinion and competition among individual, group, and government.

Political conflicts related to issues of a political organization or political party occur between individual and other individuals, between individual and group, or between group and other groups in the process to achieve shared ambitions and goals through various means. Politics is always related to the purpose of the whole community rather than the individual one although it also involves the activities of various groups including political parties and individual activities.

The retired soldiers' declaration to Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa were carried out several times: first, the declaration at Ruang Birawa Menara Bidakara, Pancoran, Jakarta on March 27, 2014 (Tempo, June 3, 2014); second, the declaration held at Club House Jagorawi on May 21, 2014, in which of 80 high-ranking retired soldiers gave their support to the candidate (Tribunews, May 21, 2014); third, the declaration in Limboto District, Gorontalo June 2, 2014 (Antara, June 2, 2014); fourth, the declaration in South Tangerang, on June 5, 2014, by Assistant Admiral Muclas Sidiq (Ret.) and attended by hundreds of the retired soldiers (Ihram, June 4, 2014).

On the other hand, some retired soldiers also held meetings and declared themselves in support of the other presidential candidate Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla with the number of supporters no less than those of Prabowo-Hatta. Similar to Prabowo-Hatta's supporters, the retired soldiers also made declaration to encourage public to elect Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. There were at least 4 (four) declarations made by the retired soldiers in support of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla.

The first declaration was called Bravo 5 located at Jalan Banyumas Number 5, Menteng, Central Jakarta. It was the first

declaration from the retired soldiers to support Jokowi-JK (Tempo, July 2, 2014); Second, the Retired soldiers declaration located at Rachmawati residence on Jalan Iskandarsyah II, South Jakarta, on May 27, 2014 (Detik, June 1, 2014); Third, the declaration of Komunitas Pondok Bangsa, located in Kebayoran Baru, South Jakarta on May 28, 2014 (Detik, May 29, 2014); Fourth, the Declaration of Jenggala, located at the Jokowi-JK campaign center, Jalan Jenggala II 6 B, South Jakarta on May 28, 2014 (Detik, May 24, 2014).

The retired soldiers's support to the two presidential candidates of Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, according to Broto Wijaya, (bbc indonesia, 2014) will negatively affect the Presidential Election. It was due to the retired soldiers has commanding network, it is easier for them to communicate with subordinates and former subordinates to gain their support.

The declaration by the retired soldiers, on the one hand, is considered a form of freedom by the retired soldiers after they are integrated into a civil society with their political rights and the right to vote and to be voted. In addition, they also have political views and support for potential leaders who are thought to be capable of realizing Pancasila and the Constitution 45.

According to AG (personal interview, February 11, 2018), when the retired soldiers retire, they have the same position as the other civilians with similar rights that should be implemented and given. Each retired soldier has his/her own interests in providing support to the presidential candidates. Candidates with military or civil background are not a problem for them as long as these candidates have a responsibility to the community and the country. Differences in political choices are considered fair among the retired soldiers and such are the dynamics that the society can learn and experience.

AT also agreed with AG statement that upon becoming a citizen, each member of the retired soldiers has the freedom to join a political party, become a volunteer for presidential campaign, or run other businesses outside the political world. Although they involve in politics and gives support to one of the presidential candidates, it is simply a form of political freedom after they retire from the military.

Salim Said argued that there was nothing wrong with the declarations made by the retired soldiers, since they have retired, and they have civil rights, to vote and to be voted. The support given to the presidential candidates of Prabowo Subianto-Hatta and Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla is a form of political participation by the retired soldiers, which they did not have during their service in the military.

The division of the retired soldiers' support for presidential candidate led to conflicts among themselves. This conflict led to a series of attacks among the retired soldiers in the mass media by the

time of the presidential election. One of the conflicts was the Published letter number KEP/03/VIII/1998/DKP regarding eleven considerations of Prabowo's dismissal recommendations including abuse of authority and procedural violations such as abandonment of operating systems and legal discipline in the Armed Forces environment. Thus, it led to "war statement" between Fakhru Razi and Agum Gumelar as Jokowi-JK-supporter with Kivlan Zen and Johannes SP as Prabowo-Hatta supporter (Tempo, June 6-22, 2014).

The issue of Prabowo's dismissal began with the assignment of *Satuan Tugas Mawar* or better known as the Mawar Team to kidnap the prodemocracy activists. The order was sent through Colonel Infantry Chairawan, the Group 4 Commander, and Major Infantry Bambang Kristiono. Major Bambang formed the Mawa Team with 10 members from the 81/Antiterror Detachment officers and commanders. Their job was to find and uncover threats to national stability. The Mawar team moved confidentially by using black or undercover method. The incidence of house explosion in Tanah Tinggi prompted Major Bambang to further enhance his team's work in gathering intelligence data (Sindonews, 2016).

Prior to the 1998 MPR General Assembly, there were 28 people abducted or secured. They were mostly from Democratic People's Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik-PRD) activists. Of those 28, nine of them had been on the DPO (wanted list). They were Andi Arief, Nezar Patria, Desmond J Hahesa, Pius Lustilarang, Haryanto Taslam, Faisol Resha, and Raharjo Waluajati. During the incarceration, they experienced inhumane treatment including torture, stripping and staining (Sindonews, 2016). There were 14 others kidnapped by the Mawar Team, namely Yanie Afri, Sony, Herman Hedrawan, Dedi Hamdun, Noval Alkatiri, Ismail, Suyat, Petrus Bima Anugrah, Wiji Thukul, Ucock Munandar, Hendra Hambali, Yadin Muhidin and Abdun Naser. However, until now, these 14 people are still missing. In addition, the May 1998 riots led to another number of riots, persecution, and shootings carried out by the military, killing four Trisakti students.

There were several allegations addressed to Prabowo; first, he was accused of unilaterally mobilizing his forces during the 1998 riots; second, Prabowo was the mastermind of ethnic violence in several cities in Indonesia; third, he was accused of mobilizing Kostrad troops in Jakarta without Wiranto's official command to besiege President BJ Habibie's house on May 22, 1998, a day after Suharto resigned and Habibie was appointed president in his place. (Kumparan, 2017)

In light of Prabowo's actions, the Officers Honor Board (*Dewan Kehormatan Perwira* or DKP) judged that Prabowo neglected the operating system, hierarchy, and discipline in the military environment. Prabowo was also considered not to carry the

ethics of professionalism and responsibility. The Officers Honor Board also judged that Prabowo committed a crime of non-compliance. Another crime committed to Prabowo was the deprivation of others' liberties and abduction. The letter of his dismissal was issued in the letter number KEP/03/VIII/1998/DKP. In the letter, there are eight of Prabowo's mistakes which lead to the recommendation of his dismissal from the military service.

At the 2014 Presidential Election, the issue of Prabowo's dismissal came to light with the release of Prabowo's letter of dismissal from the DKP. This information was approved by several retired soldiers who were Prabowo's political opponents in the 2014 election. Some of them were General Wiranto (Ret.), General Agum Gumelar (Ret.), General Fakrur Razi (Ret.) Wiranto on several occasions in the media said:

"... the act was considered to be in violation of the *Sapta Marga*, the soldiers' oath, the military ethics as well as certain sections of the Penal Code ... (Liputan6, June 14, 2014)"

"... we judged according to a policy relevant to that current state of politics and law. The human rights law did not exist back then. In the past, the Indonesian National Armed Forces conducted military procedures and process to form the DKP.. (Merdeka, June 19, 2014)"

Agum Gumelar also dismissed that the publication of Prabowo's dismissal letter was a part of the black campaign. Black campaign is a tool to slander political opponents without being based on relevant data. Meanwhile, Prabowo's dismissal letter was the result of the DKP formed by the Army Commander issuing a recommendation of dismissal against Prabowo. Agum also added that this is part of the history of this nation already recorded, especially for *Kopassus*.

The DKP official document clearly and conclusively concludes that Prabowo Subianto was sanctioned by administrative law through his disrespectful dismissal from the military service. In the document, it is also stated that the reason for his dismissal is summarized in 7 points as follows (Liputan6, June 8, 2014):

1. The actions of the Lieutenant General Prabowo tend to ignore the operating system, hierarchy, discipline and law that prevail in the Armed Forces.
2. His actions do not reflect the professionalism ethics in decision-making, adherence to legal and national norms, and norms prevailing in the Indonesian National Armed Forces and *Kopassus*.
3. His actions do not reflect the commander's responsibility for the task and the soldiers.
4. His actions do not reflect the military officer's ethics in particular the defenders of truth and justice, loyalty, obedience, and humanity, and

do not uphold the name and honor of the Indonesian National Armed Forces.

5. His actions do not reflect on the Soldiers' Oath 2, 3, and 4.
6. His actions do not reflect the *Sapta Marga* 3, 5, and 6.
7. He has committed a crime of:
 - a. Non-compliance (Article 103 of the Military Penal Code).
 - b. Ordering Group-4/Sandha Kopassus and members of Merpati and Mawaw Task Force to deprive others from their liberty (Article 55 (1) to the 2 juncto Article 333 of the Penal Code) and kidnapping (Article 55 (1) to 2 of Article 328 of the Penal Code)

The DKP recommended that the Inspected Officer Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto to be sentenced to administrative detention in the event of a dismissal from the military service. The letter was issued on Friday, August 21, 1998, by the DKP. The letter was signed by Chief General Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo, Secretary Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago, Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Fachrul Razi. The next was Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Lieutenant General Army Yusuf Cartanegara, Lieutenant General Agum Gumarar, and Lieutenant General Arie J. Kumaat.

The information related Prabowo's dismissal got harsh reaction from Kivlan Zein'. He argued that the Army should have *Jiwa Korsa* (spirit of unity), so they should support each other. Prabowo's nomination for the President should also have the support from another retired soldiers. Although some do not support Prabowo, they should not attack his personal life.

Kivlan argued that the statements issued by Wiranto and Agum Gumelar were a form of black campaign that wanted to overthrow Prabowo considering what Prabowo and his troops were doing under the command of the military commander General Wiranto. According to Kivlan, the disappearance of some activists by May 1998 was not a kidnapping, but rather to save the country from riots and bombing attempts in Tanah Tinggi Central Jakarta by members of Democratic People's Party (PRD).¹

¹ The incident of bomb explosion at the Johar Flat Tanah Tinggi began with the three young men renting Room V, No. 510. The flat is located near CSIS office at Jl. Tanah Abang III/27, Central Jakarta. Based on the testimony of the local head official, the three men did not have any issues during their stay until Sunday, January 18, 1998 when the explosion occurred inside their room due to an unsuccessful attempt to assemble a small bomb. The regulation of power outage in the event of any incidents made it difficult for the three young men to escape, so one of them was detained while the other two escaped with serious burns. The detained man was known as Agus Priyono (now PRD Chairman), Indonesian Student Solidarity Activist for Democracy (SMID) activist, PRD wing organization, and later a PRD activist Rahmat Basuki was arrested in Jogjakarta. From the search of the security at the explosion scene 52 evidence items were seized: laptops with emails, meeting minutes, passports and ID cards under the name of Daniel Indrakusuma, savings books, floppy disks, detonators, ammunition, batteries, timers, and so on. (Republika, January 14, 2016)

The JS (personal interview, January 19, 2019) also argued that Prabowo's dismissal letter circulated in the media was a form of disrespect for retired military personnel. He said that it was unethical for the military personnel to reveal the secret of the Army. It gave bad examples things to military juniors when they have different choices.

JS was against any slanderous news spread by the retired soldiers whether senior or junior considering it is not common to disgrace a soldier. A soldier has made a solemn oath to be loyal to the country and to the corps. Thus, all issues t in the military institution should be kept inside not to be a public consumption that can taint the image of the Indonesian National Armed Forces in the society.

The action of General Wiranto (Ret.), former military commander-in-chief, accusing Prabowo of leading the kidnapping of the 1998 activists triggered clashes among the retired soldiers. Following this accusation, a number of retired soldiers threw accusations at each other. Dozens of Special Forces Command (Kopassus) retired soldiers publicly expressed their anger over the actions of Wiranto who was also a member of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) - Jusuf Kalla (JK) campaign team. They asked Wiranto to restore Kopassus' wing in connection with the accusations he made against Prabowo (Republika, June 23, 2014).

The representative from Kopassus' retired soldiers, Colonel Ruby (Ret.) said that he was offended by Wiranto's political moves. According to him, what Wiranto disclosed to public would potentially bring clashes and conflicts. Ruby stated that the retired soldiers were offended by Wiranto's statement. The statement prompted a number of retired soldiers to give their support for Prabowo. This statement was also thought to have sparked the active military personnel from the lower rank.

On the other hand, the retired soldiers who joined Jokowi-JK campaign, General Fachrul Razi (Ret.) believed that the threat of removing Wiranto's Honorary Citation from some retired soldiers was a fabricated issue. "This issue is fabricated by some people,". He also said the retired soldiers in Jokowi-JK campaign team did not need to respond to the threat. Major General Fuad Basya confirmed the polarization among the retired soldiers. Fuad argued that the Indonesian National Armed Forces understood this polarization as those retired soldiers were the former military personnel and were no longer attached to the military service. He also stressed that the Indonesian National Armed Forces would not be affected by the controversy.

The conflicts among the retired soldiers in politics during the 2014 presidential election indicate that there is a group and individual interest brought by the retired soldiers to politics. There is a historical aspect of the different political views among the retired soldiers, and

the differences still exist today. The retired soldiers in conflicts are those whose political views were different during the New Order regime. The Nationalist faction came from the group of a nationalist army that did not bring religious interest. The group was motivated by General Benny Moerdani, Major General Edi Sudrajat, Major General Sintong Pandjaitan, Brigadier General Theo Syafei. Meanwhile the Green Faction was identified with the army carrying the Islamic subculture and are close to Islamic leading figures. This group was supported by several Generals including Major General R. Hartono and Major General Faisal Tanjung.

The conflicts among the retired soldiers have not yet reached destructive stages such as suppression, destruction, or demolition. However, the “war statement” among these retired soldiers is considered unethical by the public because it does not reflect the military values of the *Sapta Marga* and the *Sumpah Prajurit*. The lack language manners and pleasantries between senior and junior is considered a negative thing such as between Johannes Suryo Prabowo graduated in 1976 Wiranto graduated 1968. In addition, it also occurred in the “war statement” between Kivlan Zein who graduated in 1971 and Fakrur Razi who graduated in 1970.

From the research findings, it can be concluded that; First, several retired soldiers once joined in the same team during the 2009 presidential election. They were AM Hendropriyono, Agum Gumelar, Fachrul Razi, Kivlan Zein, Johannes Suryo Prabowo. However, they had different political choice during the 2014 presidential due to their pragmatic importance of gaining power and position in the government; Second, the conflicts of interest of among the retired soldiers in June 2014 has resulted in the loss of language manners and pleasantries within the structure of the retired soldiers; Third, the involvement of the retired soldiers in politics particularly as a campaign team was more significant in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections. The retired soldiers are considered to have the capability to implement military strategy in order to beat their opponents and to win the battle.

The Relation of the Retired soldiers and Joko Widodo

Prior to analyzing how the relation of the retired soldiers and Joko Widodo was formed after the 2014 Presidential Election, the following is a brief overview of how the former Indonesian President dealt with the active military personnel and the retired soldiers. First, President Wahid's inability to secure military support during his rule led to his impeachment in 2001 even though the military at the beginning of the transition from Habibie to Wahid provided its support to the government. The only form of the military support for Wahid's administration was its acceptance of the new paradigm of the civilian authority over the military, under which the military is subordinate to the civilian Department of Defense (Muradi, 2004).

The conflict between Wahid and the military, however, eventually prompted the military to carry out the impeachment. The military then supported Vice President Megawati as the replacement of Wahid.

Second, during Megawati's administration, the pattern of civil-military relation reflected the government's weakness in meeting military expectation. The military development in this era was remilitarization although it was not motivated by the political will of the government. The situation in the Megawati government was not demilitarization as some parties expected, but rather the military took various steps to regain its roles like those of in the New Order (Bainus, 2018).

Third, during Yudhoyono's administration (2004-2015), Yudhoyono appointed five senior generals to serve as the ministers in his cabinet. In addition, Yudhoyono's refusal of Rymizard Ryacudu to become Commander of the Army as the replacement of General Endiariono Sutarto was motivated by the intention to avoid dualism leadership dualism in the military body. General Ryamizard Ryacudu was promoted by Megawati to the position of Commander of the Army, but the letter of his promotion was revoked by Yudhoyono. As the replacement of General Endiariono Sutarto, General Djoko Susanto was appointed as Commander of the Army.

It was Yudhoyono's political move to secure his control over the military specially to strengthen the military support for his plan to find a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Aceh. Yudhoyono's ability to assert his control over the state affairs of by forging an alliance with the army generals contributed to the success of the Aceh peace negotiation and strengthened the popularity of his domestic and international legacy (Sebastian et al., 2018).

Of the three previous administrations, Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono, there were differences in positioning the active military personnel and the retired soldiers. The political involvement of the retired soldiers still had a strong influence. The government has dependency on the retired soldiers in securing its power and weakening the opposition. The retired soldiers certainly have access to active military personnel in the form of patron-client relation which can be used to benefit the nation.

After Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was inaugurated as the 7th president of the Republic of Indonesia on October 20, He appointed General Gatot Nurmantyo, The Chief of Staff of Indonesian Army (*Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat* or KSAD), as Commander of the Army. Jokowi said the appointment of Gatot was in the interest to strengthen the military in facing the geopolitical, geo-economics and geostrategic of the region (Kompas.com, June, 10, 2015).

Jokowi used the strength of the retired soldiers to deal with the opposition that was also supported by those who opposed Prabowo.

Jokowi placed the retired soldiers in strategic positions such as the Chief of Presidential Staff, the Minister of Defense, and the Head of State Intelligence Agency. The support from the parliament was also one of the steps that Jokowi took to gain more support for his administration.

Jokowi appointed Luhut Pandjaitan as the Chief of Presidential Staff. He was then appointed the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. Jokowi subsequently appointed General Wiranto as the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. This appointment was motivated by several factors: First, as a signal that Jokowi was still in charge of his administration and not just as Luhut's puppet; Second, as a political patronage, Wiranto was the leader of the Hanura Party that supported Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election (Sebastian et al., 2018).

President Jokowi appointed Moeldoko as the Chief of the Presidential staff. Then, he also appointed Agum Gumelar, Subagyo HS and Yusuf Kartanegara as members of the Presidential Advisory Board. These three retired soldiers played a significant role in the Jokowi's victory in the 2014 elections. The reality of the 2014 presidential election shows that the retired soldiers have a strong established personal network, which has evolved over the years when they were in the Army.

Furthermore, Jokowi also appointed retired polices such as Budi Gunawan as Deputy Chief of Police in 2015, and in 2016 he was appointed as the Head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN). Budi Gunawan is close to Megawati, so Jokowi needs to secure his position. Another General who has close relationship with Megawati is Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was appointed as the Minister of Defense. Then, Jokowi also appointed Gories Mere as the Head of the National Narcotics Agency and Djoko Suyadi as the National Cyber and Code Agency (BSSN) (Tribunnews, 2018).

Jokowi placed the retired soldiers in a strategic position with the aim of securing his power. There were many issues that Jokowi's administration should address not only social economic and political issues but also the issues with Prabowo who was also surrounded by influential retired soldiers such as Kivlan Zein, Johannes Suryo Prabowo, Djoko Susanto and Asril Tanjung.

Jokowi's strategy of involving a number of retired soldiers in his administration, according to Santoso (2018), is a form of political equilibrium between supporting parties and the military. Jokowi had to create new circles in order to control the government, so the growing opinion that Jokowi relied on the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as the basis for his support is fully supported.

From the explanation, it can be inferred that the presence of the retired soldiers is crucial in winning and securing the

government. The retired soldiers are for the campaign team of the 2014 presidential election. Some good characters of retired soldiers include they are highly loyal, have intelligence background, and can build partnerships with others. However, they also have an interest in obtaining political power in the government, which affects public policy making.

Conclusion

The involvement of the retired soldiers in politics confirms the thesis that after the military personnel retire, they have the desire to gain the position in the public office and the government by following the path of democracy. The political involvement of the retired soldiers is not as the representative of the military institution. Their involvement in politics is not entirely a stabilizer or a dynamic actor that facilitates civil-military relation in Indonesia. The retired soldiers move on their own initiative to make political compromises with civilian candidates and might form a coalition with the active military personnel in leading their presidential candidates to win the election. Sometimes, the political maneuvers made by the retired soldiers bring conflicts among themselves and tend to weaken the democratic system.

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