

Ddevelopment and Modernization of Minangkabau People

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THE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF MINANGKABAU PEOPLE IN SUMATERA BARAT IN INDONESIA: THEIR IMPACT TOWARDS LOCAL IDENTITY

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ABSTRACT

Development and modernisation are government programmes that are aimed at transforming a country into a more advanced condition. Since its independence in 1945, there have been three governmental systems conducting these programmes in Indonesia. From 1945 to 1966, the programmes of development and modernisation were carried by Old Order regime. New Order regime took the task in 1966 until it began to unravel in 1998. After a fundamental reform in 1998, the duty to carry development and modernisation across the country is no more in the hand of central government in Jakarta, yet it is handed over to local governances or provincial governances. It also worth noting that reforms in 1998 has granted local governments a greater autonomy to manage their regions. These three governmental systems have significant differences in fulfilling their responsibility in developing and modernising Indonesia. Consequently, these differences also have significant impacts in creating scores of social changes, especially in terms of identity change of local people in Indonesia. The most prevalent difference, in regards with identity of the local people, can be observed between the rule of the New Order regime and the administration of local autonomy government.

CONTENT

The New Order administration had attempted to develop and modernize the people of Minangkabau in which during those processes, they change this ethnic's style of government, namely *pemerintahan nagari* with village governmental system. However, after the reforms, the former system is reconstructed so that the Minangkabau people are able to re-practice their customary governmental system.

Changes in local governmental system, both directly and indirectly, may influence the social dynamic of the Minangkabau people. Most importantly, these changes also affect this ethnic's social aspects. The most feasible problem from these changes is the magnitude of differences between the notion of development and modernisation carried

by the village governmental system and *pemerintahan nagari*. Summarily, the changes have a great implication on the rise and the fall of the Minangkabau people's identity.

To investigate how changes in local identity emerge because of different policies of development and modernisation carried by *pemerintahan nagari* and village governmental system, I have conducted interviews and delivered questionnaire to 350 respondents. To analyse the effect of the changes from *pemerintahan nagari* to village governmental system and the revival of *pemerintahan nagari* in the era of local autonomy, I utilize structural functional theory. This theory emphasises that social changes are resulted from changes in a particular society's system. These changes have two implications, namely: stability and instability. In Indonesia, the change from local style of governmental system to village governmental system and the revival of the former system are considered as changes in system, which lead to social changes which point to stability and instability.

The change from local style of governmental system to village governmental system was regulated by the New Order rule in 1980 as one of its effort to develop and modernise the country. It is found that this policy has marginalized the role of local norms and values. Worst, as in the case of the Minangkabau people, norms and values imposed by village governmental system are at odds with local customs. This change has accordingly generated many polemics and conflicts in that society.

The most lucid social change observed as the result of the change from *pemerintahan nagari* to village governmental system is the diminishing of the unity of the customary society. It is caused by the village system which divides the customary geography of a *nagari* that makes the existence of a *nagari* is threatened and paralyses its legal foundation to unite the people to achieve a common goal. Further, the founding of village governmental system is also one of crucial factors which lead to the vanishing of a *nagari*'s autonomy, which has been preserved for a long time by the Minangkabau people. Moreover, the village governmental system also has a hand in destroying the authority of customary laws which has a direct effect on the management of *tanah ulayat* (customary land), as the *nagari*'s economic asset. During the village governmental

system, *tanah ulayat* was controlled by unauthorized persons and was not utilized to the benefit of a *nagari* or to prosper the people.

In Minangkabau land, due to the surplus of the budget, the New Order rule founded many villages. In other words, those villages were founded not on solid ground. As a result, the village governmental system only spawns problems in Minangkabau. To put it in another way, these problems deny the Minangkabau people social order and subsequently no development materializes. Thus, the village governmental system of which initial objective is to transform the people of Minangkabau is not achieved.

Development and modernisation policies that do not consider social aspects, which are practised by local people, have violated the role of customary laws, customary institutions, and social traditions which play a significant function in the building of social order. Moreover, this infringement has made customary approach to solve a particular social problem is crippled. Further, these policies have also caused many conflicts and social problems since the tools to watch the people's behaviour have died out.

The village governmental system has also marginalized the role of customary institutions and terminating the existence of customary legislative and judicative bodies which have been founded by the *pemerintahan nagari*. Consequently, the head of the village will become the sole power holder, i.e. the absolute executive, which betrays the tradition of democracy cherished in the tradition of the Minangkabau people. Automatically, the instalment of the head of the village by the central government has ended the tradition of elections and consensus which are the prominent characteristic of this ethnic. Worst, the diminishing of these traditions have denied the people education in politic and democracy. Moreover, the head of the village is also perceived as lacking the legitimate right to rule since he/she is not chosen directly by the people. ⁵³ As a result, their governments find it difficult to relate harmoniously with the common people. At the same time, this condition also prevents the people to actively participate in the development and modernisation programmes. Thus, during the imposing of the village governmental

system in Minangkabau, many social programmes designed by the government do not materialize.

The tradition of consensus also meets its decline in the social life of the people during the village governmental system. Many important decisions related to the well being of the people are taken unilaterally by the central government which are passed down to the head of the village as its dignitary. In other words, the people are left with no choice unless complying with those decisions. Consequently, the tradition of mutual aid and cooperation, which are the social capital of the Minangkabau people, are gradually corroded. In short, the people of Minangkabau are contextually cornered as the mere power subjects who are constantly demanded to act in accordance with the rules of the central government.

Another implication of the decline of the tradition of mutual aid and cooperation is the dependence of the development and modernisation programmes on the government budget. In fact, the people can be involved in helping the government to complete those programmes. It is worth noting that this dependence on the government budget took grave toll after 1987 whereby the government of West Sumatra province, where the Minangkabau people reside, faced serious polemic since several villages has to be merged into one village out of financial lack for the central government began to reduce its funds for village development and modernisation programmes. Subsequently, the village government could not speed up the effort to prosper the people. Hence, poverty is still a major problem in villages. Thus, the initial objective of the founding of the village governmental system is not fully met.

Further, the existence of the village governmental system in Minangkabau has also eroded the tradition whereby the people sit together to discuss the development plans for their region. In other words, it is a down top planning in which people intend to develop what they need the most. On the contrary, the central government tends to nationalize its policies without considering the large number of different ethnicities in Indonesia and the multitude of differences they have. To put it in another way, the government's development and modernisation programme is a top-down policy.

Sometimes this kind of policy becomes a serious blunder for the government since they give the people what they do not need or vice versa. Subsequently, the government fail to arrive at their objectives such as to make poverty history in rural areas.

The people of Minangkabau value the philosophy of ³⁷ *adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah* (Minangkabau customary laws are based on Islamic regulations which are derived from the holy Qur'an). In other words, in Minangkabau what the religion, which is officially Islam, has promulgated becomes the people customs. Meanwhile, during the reign of the village governmental system, this synergy experienced critical waning since the government did not provide enough facilities which can be utilized to carry on the tradition. Consequently, it is no wonder at all that a younger generation is deprived from this tradition, in other words, they are short of knowledge on both of religion and custom. Hence, they are in the way of losing their identity as Minangkabau people. Thus, the village governmental system has made the Minangkabau culture, as a whole, is prone to extinction.

⁵² On the contrary, after the fall of the New Order rule, the local governments are granted more autonomy. For this reason, the development programmes are conducted against each ethnic's socio-political and cultural background. To put it in another way, modernisation is no longer seen under the light of leaving the traditions behind. Hence, in Minangkabau, people are eager to reconstruct the system of *pemerintahan nagari*. Therefore, for the Minangkabau people, the era of local autonomy is the time to reconstruct their long lost tradition.

⁵¹ It is also important to trace the history of the rise and the fall of the system of *pemerintahan nagari* in Minangkabau. During the time of Dutch colonialism, this system was acknowledged as written in Article 71 RR (*Regeeringsreglement*) or Article 128 IS (*Indische-staatsregeling*). After the Japanese ousted the Dutch, they did not bother with the system, even, they legitimized it in Japanese Government Regulation No 1 year 1942 and *Osamu Rei* Regulation No 27 year 1942. After Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, this country was ruled by the Old Order regime. Interestingly, this regime did not mind with the system of *pemerintahan nagari*. In contrast, the New Order administration

which came to power in 1966, issued a regulation to replace each ethnic's traditional governmental system with village governmental system, which automatically sent the Minangkabau governmental system into disappearance. However, this system is reconstructed in the era of local autonomy as written in Regulation No 22 year 1999 and the Regulation of West Sumatra Government No 9 year 2000.

Based in the regulation mentioned above, local government began to launch people-based development policies. It means, these policies consider and respect the local people socio-cultural context. Hence, traditions and culture are no longer perceived as something old-fashioned. Interestingly, traditions and culture are currently seen as perfect partner for the government to complete their development policies. Therefore, it is not exaggerating if there is a claim that units of customary society are widely celebrated in Indonesia. It is in line with the principle of Chapter I, Article no 1, part 15 of Constitution no 22 year 1999 which states that *a nagari is one of the customary society units which has the authority to rule and manage local people's affair in regards with local customs and is acknowledged by national government*. Further, the Regulation of West Sumatra Government No 9 year 2000 clearly states that *the system of pemerintahan nagari is perceived as effective in preserving the religion and traditions of the people of West Sumatra, who are democratic and have aspirations in materializing an independent society and pemerintahan nagari is also remarked as a way in which the people can actively and creatively involve in developing the region, the right the New Order rule has denied them*.

Importantly, this regulation has authorized the reunification of the geographically divided *nagari* caused by the founding of the village governmental system instigated by the New Order administration. This unification is recognized as a crucial thing to be carried since it will found a *pemerintahan nagari* which has solid autonomy. The implication of this unification is to clarify the unit of the customary society of that *nagari* and to revive the function of the *nagari's* customary institution and economic asset, namely *tanah ulayat*. Meanwhile, in the era of local autonomy, there are enormous changes take place in Minangkabau. For an instance, traditions which had been promoted by the village governmental system are radically changed to follow the needs of the

pemerintahan nagari. One of the most prominent feature of the revival of the system of *pemerintahan nagari* is the people begin to practice many long lost traditions. It comes along with the rise of customary laws, customary institutions, *orang adat* (customary people), religious elites, and local democracy.

The ascendance of local democracy can be observed in the way the Minangkabau people vote for their leaders. In other words, currently, every head of the *nagari* is voted by the population of that *nagari* via popular elections. Subsequently, the people of Minangkabau have succeeded in releasing the hegemony of the central government. The most visible implication of the tradition of elections is the people have chances to undergo political education, which the village governmental system has disallowed them previously.

Moreover, the reconstruction of *balai adat* (custmary hall) implies the return of the tradition of concensus among the Minangkabau people. Importantly, *balai adat* suggests that democracy finds its place among the people. The implication of the return of the customary hall is people began to sit together to discuss and arrange their own development plans. In other words, the pattern of the *nagari*'s devlopment is down-top, in contrast to the top-down pattern during the rule of village governmental system. As a result, the *nagari*'s development programmes hit the right target. Therefore, the development programmes carried by the system of *pemerintahan nagari* is an effort to minimize the development programmes which are based on hegemony.

In addition, the era of local autonomy is marked by the return of the ideal democratic governmental system whereby there is no particular party that holds a supreme power. In the system of *nagar*, there are other two pivotal elements namely: legislative institution and judicative institution that keep an eye on how executive institution runs the *nagari*. In other words, *pemerintahan nagari* resembles the administration of a modern republic. To be exact, *pemerintahan nagari* is a mini republic. Consequently, this development has empowered the authority of customary institutions and re-imposed the customary laws. It is also worth noting that the customary institution is a formal body, so that it will not be easily challenged by the central power.

Another objective of the re-activating of the customary institutions is to solve problems emerging in the society by approaching them from customary laws' point of view. Initially, customary institutions are also founded to shoulder the task of internalizing customs with culture in the people's everyday's lives. However, as impinged earlier in this study, the founding of village governmental system has sent this institution into the state of dormant for more than two decades, so that there is no institution responsible for educating the people in regards with the customs. Hence, we can also understand that efforts to re-activate customary institutions are ways to resolve social problems by using customary laws and are means to construct effective tools which are potential to maintain socio-cultural based social stability. In addition, *pemerintahan nagari* also establish religion institution as an instrument to edify the people to live by their religion.

At present, in many *nagaris*, people are busy organising movements related to religious and traditions studies that are aimed at re-creating the *nagari*'s social dynamic, which is based on the philosophy of *adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah*. Further, the current trend of returning to the system of *pemerintahan nagari* can be perceived as , on the one hand, an endeavour restore the people's tradition, and on the other hand, to challenge 'modern' tradition implanted by the central government. The most clear feature of this resistant effort is the re-implementation of customary rules. Afterwards, the dynamic of the *nagari*'s social life is experiencing transformation from the dynamic of modernisation into the dynamic which is derived from Minangkabau traditions and culture. This change is also followed by the return of the tradition of *hidup berkaum* (communal living). A tradition that is aimed at resisting the notion of individualism which is the direct product of the village governmental system.

The restoration of the system of *pemerintahan nagari* can be read as an attempt to reconstruct traditions and the dynamic of social life which fit Minangkabau culture. Hence, in the era of local autonomy, the people of Minangkabau are embracing their initial cultural identity, which the village governmental system has denied them. This change is actually caused by village governmental system's failure to develop and modernise the people. Moreover, it has been duly proven that the village governmental

system has lacerated numerous aspects that are responsible for social stability. In short, the failure of the government to develop and modernise the people is their insensitivity toward the people's culture and social values; they radically change the tradition and install new culture which is completely different from the people's initial culture.

Conclusively, the village governmental system, which is originally planned to speed up the process of development and modernisation, has fallen short. In the case of the people of Minangkabau, the village governmental system has generated many social conflicts which obviously slow down the attempts to developments. Further, the village governmental system in Minangkabau has mouldered traditions, which are functional to preserve social stability. In other words, that **system has failed to bring** prosperity and **social** stability. Hence, **in the** era of local autonomy, the people of Minangkabau challenge that system and they re-construct their once-marginalized governmental system.

This change is in line with functional theory, which states that stability is the fountain of harmony, dynamism, and integration in a society. If changes imposed to that society will only cause instability, it is normal to find out movements to revive the marginalized system to restore the stability. For an instance, the people of Minangkabau identify that their tradition and social system are able to conceive stability compared to what the New Order administration has enforced on them. Hence, it is not exaggerating to say that development and modernisation programmes, which are not based on traditions and cultural values, will never succeed. For the people of Minangkabau, the road to development and modernisation is to go back to their own traditions. Therefore, there is solid ground to argue that traditions are supportive to development since they contain worldview that will materialise dynamism.

Learning from the fall and the rise of the *pemerintahan nagari* system, it is clear that the development and modernisation policies orchestrated by the New Order government have instigated changes in the identity of the Minangkabau people. This identity change is the direct result of the village governmental system policy that is contradictory completely with the system the people of Minangkabau traditionally practice. This change has made the identity of the Minangkabau people complies with

what the village governmental system has designed. In other words, power is able to change identity. However, identity change can trigger social instability. Consequently, social conflicts will arise and the path to development and prosperity, as what the government wish, are difficult to achieve.

In the era of local autonomy, Minangkabau social traditions are no longer seen as challenges to development and modernisation. It means during the local autonomy era, those programmes do not harm the people's identity anymore. In this context, it is wise if we refer to Eriksen (1993), who avers that identity is changeable and the party who owns the power to do so can control the direction of its transformation. In other words, those who rule the people can determine those people's identity. In the case of the people of Minangkabau, during the reign of the village governmental system with their development and modernisation programmes, the people's identity is the one the authority directs them to adopt. On the contrary, during the era of local autonomy, when development and modernisation programmes are controlled by *pemerintahan nagari*, the people's identity goes along with their traditions enquire them to embrace.

Therefore, the transformation from *pemerintahan nagari* to the village governmental system and vice versa is more than changes in terms of bureaucracy, administration, and governmental system. Yet, it has something to do with social changes which influence social stability and social order. In this context, the authority has to consider carefully whether their development and modernisation programmes will bring about stability or, in contrast, instability. Hence, those programmes have to take into account the people's reception of them. Importantly, the authority is supposed not to pressurize its will on the people. If the authority fails to do so, it has to be ready to bite the bullet that its objectives are never obtained.

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